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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

PAUL JOE :MARTINEZ,

Case No.
12785

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Paul Joe
appeals from
a conviction of the crime of burglary in the second degree entered against him in the District Court of the
Second Judicial District, in and for Weber County,
State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN TIIE LO''TER COURT
The Appellant was found guilty of burglary in the
second degree by a jury, and sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one or more than twenty
years.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent submits that the judgment of the
Second District Court should be affirmed.
OF FACTS
On the evening of
7, 1971, an individual (described as about 5'8", slender build, long hair, and wearing a fringe jacket) was observed jumping from the
cab of, and running behind a late model pickup truck
and camper located in a parking area near the corner of
''rillow and Stephens Streets in 0 gden, Utah (TR 4,
5).
The individual was then observed "ducking" in anrl
out of cars parked along Willow before proceeding
down an alley off Wi1low, which parallels Stephens
about one-half block east (TR 6). :Moments later, someone was seen "crouching" behind a bush in the same
alley (TR 7).
It was then discovered that the aforementioned
truck and camper had been broken into, and a tape deck
and two tapes were missing (TR .54).

Later, Paul Joe ::\1 artinez (described as wearing a
fringe jacket and having long hair and a beard) was
observed slamming the door of and crouching behind a
second late model pickup truck parked on 'Villow by
the previously mentioned alley (TR 7, 8, 25, 26, 36) ·
Paul Joe l\Iartinez was then seen running from the
truck on 'Villow, and was apprehended and taken to the

front of the Hitching Post Lounge, located on the corner of Willow and Wall Avenues (TR 27, 28).
Around midnight, Officer Donald R.
arrived at the Hitching Post Lounge to conduct an investigation. He placed Mr. :Martinez under arrest, searched
him, and discovered a set of Ford ignition keys (TR 44,
45, 46).

Officer .:Moore summoned Officer Grant J. Price
to the Hitching Post Lounge for the sole purpose of
booking .l\1r. .l\1artinez (TR 68, 71, 73). Officer Price
arrived at the scene, but the trial record fails to clearly
show when he removed :M:r. :Martinez from the scene to
book him in the \Veber County Jail (TR 69, 70) .
_Meanwhile, Officer Moore learned from his mvestiga tion that a stereo tape deck and two tapes were
missing from the previously described truck and camper
(TR 55).
The particular tape deck and tapes were located,
30 to 60 minutes following defendant's arrest, in the
rear "boot" area of l\Ir. .l\Iartinez' Ford convertible
parked on Stephens south of the 'Villow intersection
(TR 47-49) . The rear plexiglass window of the convertible was zipped out and was laying on top of the
said tape deck and tapes (TR 48, 49, 63). No search
warrant was obtained (TR 63).
The testimony of the investigating officers is in
conflict regarding other events surrounding the discovery of the deck and tapes.

4

Officer l\Ioore, the primary investigating officer,
testified that after learning that lVIr. Martinez had
driven to the area in a Ford automobile, he looked for
and found defendant's car. He further testified that he
saw in plain view, the tape deck and tapes through the
plexiglass window lying in the ''boot" of the convertible.
Officer Price, on the other hand, testified that he
was with Officer l\Ioore when they examined the defendant's automobile, and that he, Officer Price, lifted
the plexiglass flap to observe the tape deck and tapes
in the "boot" (TR 69). Officer Price further testified
that he did not see the deck and tapes until he lifted the
flap (TR 70).
Over defendant's objection, the deck and tapes
were admitted on the ground that Officers Moore and
Price conducted a seizure without a search since the
items were in plain sight (TR 64, 74) .
ARGUMENT
POIN'f I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF GUILTY, BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE \VAS SUCH THAT
REASONABLE l\1INDS COULD BELIEVE
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
DEFENDANT co:MMITTED THE CRI1\1E OF
BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
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Appellant was convicted of burglary in the second degree under Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-3 (1953),
which in part provides:
"Every person who forcibly breaks and
enters . . . any . . . automobile, automobile
trailer . . . with intent to commit larceny or
any felony, is guilty of burglary in the second degree."
Larceny is defined by statute as "the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving away the personal property of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1
(1953).

The fact that the basic elements of the crime of
burglary were committed is not disputed by Appellant.
Appellant's first contention is that the evidence
was insufficient to positively identify defendant as the
person who committed the elements of the crime.
The rules governing the scope of appellate review
as to sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case to
sustain the verdict are well settled: It is for the jury
to judge the credibility of witnesses and determine the
facts; evidence \Vill be reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict; and if when so viewed it appears
the jury acting fairly and reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict
will not be disturbed. State v. TVard, IO U.2d 34, 341
P.2d 865 ( 1959).

t;

Reasonable doubt

1s

described as follows:

···Reasonable doubt' is not a mere lIIlagc:11)tious. or a possible dr:uht. L1;t 3. fair
Joubt. based upon reason and common sense.
and growing out of testimony in the case. and
it is such doubt as ·will leaYe juror's mind.
after a careful examination of all e'idence. in
such cond.ition that he cannot say he has an
abiding conYiction. to a moral certainty. of
.lefenJanf s guilt ... State '-'· Taylor, 21 r.2d
-12.5. -U6 P.2d 954 ( 1968).

Stat(·:-. S:dli:·an. 6 r.2d 110. 30i P.2d 212 1P57' I cert.
denfr·d 355 l-.S. 8-!8. 2 L.Ed.2d j';". i8 S.Ct. 7'4 119571.
further adds:
I

··. . . proof beyond all perad,·enture of
doubt could seldom be had. nor does the law require it.··
Respondent contends that the e'idence in the trial
record. ,-iewed under the abm·e standards. is more than
<.lllequate to identify the defendant as conunitting the
alleged crime. thus justifying the Jury s >erdict of
guilty-.
Because of the nature of the cnrne.
i'
r:uely prcn·e.-1
the direct and positi,·e eridence (1f nit·
nesses who ,-iew the actual breakini;r and entry. The in·
ference of
in most inst:mces must be drawn t'n.•n
direct and circumstantial e,·idence surround.ing the com·
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mission of the crime which tends to incriminate the defendant. State v. llopkins, 11 U.2d 363, 3.59 P.2d 486
(1961). Therefore, a fact which legitimately tends to
ronnect defendant with the commission of the offense
is admissible. The State may introduce evidence relating to the identity, presence, and acts of the accused
such as: the fact that he was seen near the scene of the
rrime, his flight from the scene, clothing worn by the
defendant, and defendant's possession of the stolen
property. II enderson v. State, 1 Ala. App. 154, .55 So.
437 (1911).
This Court has held it is not necessary that each
circumstance in itself establish the guilt of the defendant, but the whole chain of circumstances, taken together, must prove the required proof. State v. Endn,
101 U. 365, 120 P.2d 285 ( 1941).
\Vith this in mind, the identification and guilt of
the defendant are shmvn by the "whole chain of circumstances" as follows:
The individual seen by two witnesses jumping from
the cab of the burglarized vehicle. running between
parke<l cars, and proceeding down an alley, was described as 5'8", slender build, long hair, and wearing
a western fringe jacket (TR 5). Later, the dome light
of a second vehicle came on revealing the face of the
defendant, Paul Joe l\Iartinez (TR 8, 18, 19). T"wo
witnesses then vie,ved the defendant slamming the door
of and crouching behind said ,·ehicle. He was described
as heiug dressed the same as the individual in and around
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the burglarized Yehicle. and also had long hair (TR 8,
26, 31). 'Yhen a flashlight ·was shined on defendant,
he ran anrl a chase ensued. "Then the defendant was
apprehended. he was wearing gloYes, a fringed leather
jacket, and had long hair and a beard (TR 26, 27, 36,
41, 42). The gloYes were then remoYed by the defendant,
and later found under a bush (TR 42).
The State contends that the aboYe facts are sufficient to identify the def enrl.ant as the indiYidual seen
in and around the burglarized truck and camper. Appelhnt caJled no witnesses to explain his conduct on the
night in question, and the defendant failed to prm·ide
an adequate explanation for his flight from the scene
(TR 17, 18, 28). This, coupled with the defendant's
late night acti,·ities preYiously described support the
jury's Yerdict of guilty. Loper t'. e nited States, 160
F.2d 293 ( 1947).
Concerning the matter of defendant's possession
of the stolen property. the State recognizes that proof
of burglary does not require a showing that the accused
be in possession of the stolen property. State._ .. Pacheco.
13 lT.2d 148. 369 P.2d 494 ( 1962 \. HoweYer. possession can be used as tending to show intent and to connect the defen:iant with the burglary. Cbh Code
§ 76-38-1 (19.33), supra.
Appellant
states that no eY1dence "-as offered to show that defendant placed the stolen goods in
his autmnnhile. The State contends that such a showing
is unnecess:uy. The mere fact that the sh)len property

was in. defendant's· car is admissible to show constructive
possession.
The elements of constructive possession exist where
there is such a "nexus or relationship between defendant
and the goods that it is reasonable to treat the
of the defendant's dominion and control as if it were
actual possession." [T nited States v. Casalinuovo, 350
F .2d 201 ( 196.5) at 210. Thus, it is not necessary that
the property be achrnlly on defendant's person; it is
sufficient if it is in a place or receptacle over which he
exercises control. or in a place where it must necessarily
haYe been placed by him. An examination of three cases
will show what the courts consider sufficient dominion
or control.

Husten t'. United States, 95 F.2d 168 ( 1938), inrnlYed a circumstance where the stolen property was
found in an alley outside defendant's windmv after the
police had gained resisted entrance to defendant's hotel
room. The court held in favor of constructive possession.
Perhaps the leading case in this area is People 'l'.
Serirs, 119 Cal. 267, 51 P. 325 ( 1897). This was a
burglary case where the stolen goods were located in a
trunk in a stable where defendant kept his horse. The
stable was located "near" defendant's house. The court
held defendant had constructive possession of the stolen
goods.
I \Vash.App. 614, 464
Finally, in State v.
P.2d 742 (1969), the defendant was arrested for reek-
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less driving and taken to jail. The officer then searched
the car and found a tin box containing marijuana in
the glove compartment, and also located a marijuana
plant in the trunk. The court held that defendant had
dominion and control over the "premises" even though
he was in jail when the search was conducted, and thus,
he had constructive possession of the evidence.
In none of the above cases did the court require a
showing that the defendant placed the stolen property
where it was found.
In the present case, the facts show defendant's
automobile was located approximately one block from
the scene of the crime, and l 1h blocks from the place
of arrest (TR 47) ; the car was registered in the name
of Paul Joe J\fartinez (TR 47) ; a Ford ignition key
matching the automobile was found on defendant at
the time of his arrest (TR 45) ; the stolen property
was located in the "boot" area of the convertible (TR
48) ; and there was a sufficient span of time between
the first observation of the defendant, and the second
for him to deposit the goods in his car (TR 7).
Respondent contends the above facts sufficiently
show that defendant was in constructive possession of
the stolen goods, a factor which further tends to implicate defendant with the commission of the crime, and
further substantiates the validity of the jury's verdi1tt
of guilty.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM DEFENDANT'S AUTOlHOBILE \VAS PROPERLY ADl\iITTED BY Tl-IE TRIAL COURT.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits only those searches and seizures
whieh are unreasonable, and this guarantee is applicable
to the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 18
L.Ed.2d 431, 85 S.Ct., rep. den. 380 U.S. 926, 18
L.Ed.2d 813, 85 S.Ct. 879 (1965). Also see State v.
Kent, 20 U.2d 1, 432 P.2d 64 (1967). Article 1 § 14
of the Utah Constitution provides the same protection.
Since automobiles are "personal effects'', they are
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. Automobile
searches, however, are governed by more liberal constitutional standards of reasonableness than those used to
test searches of houses, buildings, etc., due to the mobility of the automobile. Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925).

A. THE EVIDENCE 'VAS IN PLAIN SIGHT
AND OBTAINED 'VITHOUT NEED FOR A
SEARCH.
The trial court held the stolen items obtained from
defendant's automobile were in plain sight, thus not
requiring a search for their discovery (TR 64) .
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In IIarris v. ·united States, 390 U.S. 234, 19
L.Ed.2d 1067, 88 S.Ct. 992 ( 1968), the Supreme Court
held that objects falling in the plain view of a police
officer who has a right to be in that position to have
that view are not the product of a search, are subject
to seizure, and may be introduced in evidence.
This doctrine was previously expressed by this
Court in State v. Allred, 16 U.2d 41, 395 P.2d 535
( 1964), where the facts revealed that defendant abandoned his car in a driveway, and the investigating officer observed in plain view on the front seat, stolen property. The Court held that no search was necessary for
the officer to find the articles, they being fully disclosed
to his view as he approached the car, and that under
such circumstances the constitutional guarantee is noi
applicable.
In the instant case, Officer :Moore testified that he
a pp roached defendant's vehicle from the left rear side,
and saw "in plain sight" a stereo and two tapes in the
"boot" area underneath the zipped-out plexiglass rear
window (TR
He later testified that he could see
the evidence from the outside, through the plexiglass
without actually entering the car (TR 49) . This testimony clearly places this case within the "plain sight"
doctrine.
Officer Price was called by the defense and questioned in part as follows:

Q.

Could you see anything through that flap
before you picked it up?
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A.

I don't recall if I could or not. It was a
plastic and you could see through it.

Q.

'Vhat condition was the plexiglass in?

A.

I don't know. I just don't remember.
(TR 69, 70).

Officer Price also could not remember whether Officer
Moore had previously. discovered defendant's convertible while Officer Price was at the jail booking defendant (TR 71, 78). He further testified that this
wasn't his case, and that he was merely called to book
the defendant (TR 71).
The State contends, and the trial court determined,
that Officer Price's recollection was obviously poor, and
it would be unreasonable to accept his testimony over
and above that of Officer l\1oore, the primary investigating officer.
To refute the State's proposition that there was no
search, Appellant contends there was a search which
commenced when the officer ( s) sought to locate defendant's automobile; that the stolen items were viewed
during the course of this "ongoing" search. Appellant
then makes a general legal statement that evidence in a
plain view case must not be the objective of an ongoing
search, a statement that is both unfounded and unsupported by the cases he cites as authority (State v. Criscola, 21 U.2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); State v. Richards, 26 U.2d 318, 489 P.2d 422 ( 1971); and Harris v.
P nited Stat es, supra.)
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The Respondent submits that Appellant's statement is valid only if the plain sight observation is made
during the course of an ongoing ILLEGAL search.
In the present case, however, the search for defendant's
automobile was legal and may not be considered part
of a search covered by the Fourth Amendment. Police
officers are only required to obtain warrants to search
places where they have no right to be. Certainly, they
have a right to be on a public street to look for an automobile of one they have arrested. Case law further gives
them the right and duty to locate, inventory, and impound an arrested person's automobile left on a street
following the arrest for the protection of the car owner
and the police. State v. Criscola, supra.
Appellant also questions the items actually being
in plain sight because the officer's observation was at
night, with the aid of a flashlight, in an area of little
lighting, through unclear plexiglass.
There are many nightime plain view cases when a
flashlight was used. In People v. Cacioppo, 264
Cal.App.2d 392, 70 Cal.Rptr. 356 (1968), the officer
stopped a vehicle for defective equipment, shined his
flashlight into the car, and discovered five benzedrine
pills on the car floor. The court held this did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure because the
pills were in plain sight. In another California case, the
officer with the aid of a flashlight, viewed from the
outside of the car a gun protruding from beneath two
pillows in the car. The court held the observation fell

1.5

under the plain sight rule, and no search occurred. People t 1• Linden. 185 Cal.App.2d 752, 8 Cal.Rptr. 640
(1960).

The issue of the unclear plexiglass has already been
considered. Officer .Moore testified he could clearly see
through the plexiglass, and Officer Price said, "It was
a plastic and you could see through it."

B. THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY OBTAINED DURING THE COURSE OF IMPOUNDING DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE.
The leading case in Utah on this subject is State v.
Criscola, supra, where this Court held that incriminating
evidence of a burglary obtained from an automobile
driven by defendant on the day following the burglary,
and after defendant's arrest for driving without a valid
driver's license, and certain evidence taken more than
a month later from the automobile defendant was driving when arrested for another traffic violation was not
obtained by an unreasonable search in view of an offirer' s duty to take inventory of the contents of an automobile at the time of its impounding. The Court further said:
"Inasmuch as he (defendant) . . . was
placed under arrest, it was necessary that the
car be taken into possession and impounded.
'Vhen the officers thus became responsible for
the car and its contents, it was in conformity
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with ordinary prudence and customary practice, for the protection of the car owner as well
as the police, for the officers to take an inventory of its contents. This of course necessarily involves discovery of what the contents
were. To suggest that under those circumstances where the police had thus come into
the possession of personal property which they
had reason to believe was connected with a
felony, they would have to go and obtain a
warrant to conduct a "search" and "find" that
which they already had lawful possession of
seems completely discordant with reason. Accordingly, there is no reason apparent to us
why the trial court should have rejected the
evidence in question as having been obtained
by an "unreasonable" search. It is our opinion
that the officers were not only acting within
their rights, but would have been remiss in their
duty if they had not done what they did in
taking the evidence and making use of it . . .
in building the case against the defendant."
State v. Criscola, supra, at 519-520.

State v. Potts, supra, also involved an inventory
search. The defendant was arrested and taken to jail.
The officer then remained with the car, called a wrecker to impound it, then searched the interior and trunk
of the car, and found the incriminating evidence. The
Washington Supreme Court sustained the officer's
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activities as a lawful inventory search. (Note that an
inventory may be made either before or after the car is
taken to a garage or other place of safety. People v ..
llfarchese, 275 Cal.App.2d 1007, 80 Cal.Rptr. 525
( 1969).)
In the present case, Officer Moore obtained the
Ford car key from the defendant, located defendant's
automobile, then called for a State impound wrecker
to impound the vehicle before he approached the car
to make a closer examination (TR 47). At this time the
tape deck and tapes \Vere viewed in the "boot" of the
car (TR 48).
The State contends that it was not the intent of
Officer .Moore to conduct an exploratory search of defendant's automobile, but to inventory the automobile
as part of the customary procedure of impounding it.
This intent is shown by his willingness to call for an impound wrecker before approaching the car. And, as
stated above, Officer Moore had the right to inventory
the car before the car was towed away.
Therefore, the evidence obtained was the result of
a valid police inventory rather than an "unreasonable"
search.

C. IF THERE 'VAS A SEARCH, IT WAS
VALID ON THE BASIS OF PROBABLE
CAUSE.
The United States Supreme Court has frequently
recognized that if law enforcement officers have prob-
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able cause for searching an automobile, such probable
cause furnished sufficient constitutional justification
for their searching the automobile without obtaining a
search warrant. Carroll v. United States, supra:
"The measure of legality of such a seizure
is ... that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the
auto which he stops and seizes has contraband
liquor therein which is illegally transported."
The latest Supreme Court case supporting this
view is Chambers v. lUoroney, 399 U.S. 42, 26 L.Ed.2d
419, 90 S.Ct. 1975 (1970), which held that a warrantless search was proper based on probable cause. The
occupants of the vehicle were arrested, and, contrary to
Appellant's inference that major risks were involved
when the search was made, the search was conducted at
the police station without a warrant after the suspected
armed occupants of the car were jailed. In the decision,
the Court laid down an important guideline for lower
courts to follow:
"For constitutional purposes, we see no
difference between on the one hand seizing
and holding a car before presenting the proband on the
able cause issue to a
other hand carrying out an immediate search
without a warrant. Given proba·ble cause to
search, either course is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment."
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When Officer l\foore arrived, he noticed the defendant being held by three citizens; he learned from
Bruce R. Peterson that a tape deck and two tapes were
missing from his burglarized truck and camper; he arrested and searched the defendant, and found a key to a
For<l automobile; he located that automobile thirty minutes to an hour after the arrest, and approximately 100
yards from the place of arrest. When Officer l\foore
was questioned by counsel, he was asked whether he felt
a need or cause to further investigate which he answered
in the affirmative (TR 53).
The above facts are sufficient to show that Offieer Moore had probable cause to search defendant's
''ehicle for the stolen tape deck and tapes.
D. IF THERE "\VAS A SEARCH, IT WAS
VALID AS INCIDENT TO ARREST.

An excellent review of the law on this subject is
given in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 11
L.Ed. 777, 84 S.Ct. 881 (1964):
"Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for
weapons or for the fruits of or implements
used to commit the crime. JVeeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 ( 1914). This right
to search and seize without a warrant has been
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extended to things under the accused's immediate control, Carroll v. United States,
supra 267 {J.S. at 158, and to an extent, depending on the circumstances of the case, to
the place where he is arrested, Agnello v.
United States, supra 269 U.S. at 30;
v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 ( 1927) ;
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,
61-62 (1950). The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified for example,
by the need ... to pret ent the destruction of
evidence of the crime . ... " (Emphasis added.)
1

Preston also expressed a test for determining the
scope of a search incident to arrest. It cannot be remote
in time or place from the arrest.
Case law defines what is reasonably contemporaneous in time and place with an arrest. In State v. lllcClung, 66 'Vash.2d 654, 404 P.2d 460 ( 1965), a search
of defendant's automobile, across the street and less
than 150 feet from the tavern in which defendant was
arrested was held valid as incidental to an arrest, and
not too remote in time and place. In Scott v. People,
166 Colo. 432, 444 P.2d 388 ( 1967), the inspection of
an unoccupied automobile parked about one-half block
from the scene of the crime was held to be a reasonable
search incident to arrest. People v. Felli, 156 C.A.2d
123, 318 P.2d 840 (1957), held that where officers
arrested defendant while he \Vas driving his automobile,
locked the vehicle and took defendant to police head-
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quarters for booking, and had the vehicle towed to the
place of storage before commencing their search (within an hour after arrest), was legal as incident to arrest.
In the present case the time of discovery was thirty
to sixty minutes after the arrest, and the car was located
within one block of the scene of the crime and l 1h blocks
from the place of arrest. Respondent submits the above
facts coupled with the possibility that the evidence might
have been removed or destroyed by friends or compatriots alerted to police suspicion, show that the search was
reasonably incident to arrest.

CONCLUSION
The State contends that the evidence was sufficient
to support the verdict of guilty because the evidence
was such that reasonable minds could believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime
of burglary in the second degree.
The State further contends that there are four
theories under which the evidence obtained from defendant's automobile can be deemed admissible.
First, the evidence was in plain sight and obtained
without a search.
Second, the evidence was legally obtained during
the course of impouding defendant's vehicle.
Third, if there was a search, it was valid on the
basis of probable cause.
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Fourth, if there was a search, it was Yalid as incident to arrest.
For the aboYe reasons, the Respondent respectfully
requests that the conYiction of the defendant for burglary in the second degree be affirmed.
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